Since the 1970s, Hezbollah has transformed itself from a shadowy militant group known primarily for terrorist attacks into Lebanon"s pre-eminent political, social, and military force. Today it has an armed militia more powerful than the Lebanese Army and a far-reaching network that delivers welfare goods and social services to its Shiite constituency throughout Lebanon. Hezbollah"s power and influence in the Levant drastically complicate the United States" aspirations to advance peace, security, and opportunity in the Greater Middle East. This paper explores the factors and circumstances that contributed to Hezbollah has transformed itself from a shadowy militant group known primarily for terrorist attacks into the country"s pre-eminent political, social, and military force. Today it has an armed militia more powerful than the Lebanese Army and a far-reaching network that delivers welfare goods and social services to its Shiite constituency throughout Lebanon. The post World War Two era thus saw the emergence of a global political system based on international law, international agreements, and international organizations, pre-eminently the United Nations, to which all member states agreed to yield some part of their sovereignty in deference to its globally accepted legitimacy. Some predicted the demise of the sovereign state in the "new world order." By the end of the century, international corporations and non-governmental organizations were also perceived to be further eroding the economic and political importance of nation-states, and added to predictions of the eventual irrelevance of states and borders. The 20th century saw the creation of new sovereign states that embraced the right of political self-determination (external sovereignty), but often struggled -and continue to struggle -to maintain control within their borders (internal sovereignty).
There is a growing concern that non-state armed groups are becoming major players in a world once dominated by states. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) refers to the largest of these groups as "para-states" since they are entities that challenge the state"s "monopoly on the use of violence within a specified geographical These violent non-state actors share certain characteristics. They also present a common challenge to national and international security, a challenge that is far greater than the sum of the individual types of group, and one that is likely to grow rather than diminish over the next several decades. 9 These groups exploit the vulnerabilities in the Westphalian system and utilize the technology and interconnectivity of the globalized world to advance their radical agendas. In many ways, Hezbollah has come full circle, from a non-state insurgent resistance movement relying on terrorist tactics to threaten the internal security of one state and the external security of another, to a full participant in the legitimate government of a state. In so doing, it has had to modify its behavior, restrain its use of terrorist violence, and open itself to the vagaries of public opinion, maintaining the good will of significant sections of the Lebanese public or risking losing its political base. This is not the behavior of a group that seeks to destroy the sovereign state, but of one that seeks to control it. Hezbollah aspires to consolidate its own legitimate power in Lebanon; to eliminate Israeli influence in Lebanon and throughout the region; and to reduce as much as possible U.S. and Western influence in the region. It remains to be seen whether it will be more or less vexing to U.S. national security interests as a terrorist organization or as a legitimate political power.
The ways in which Hezbollah has prodded the state, pre-empted it, supported it, or attacked it, depending on which course of action it wished to cause the state to take, One way to approach this question is to assess the threat in terms of an adversary"s capability to conduct hostilities as well as its intent to do so. An important distinction to make here is that threats are acts or conditions that can harm interests, whereas adversaries are people, groups, organizations, or states that are hostile to interests.
Adversaries by themselves do not necessarily constitute a threat; it is the capability and intent of an adversary that constitute a threat. These two essential elements are the basis of any threat assessment of an adversary, be it Al Qaeda or Hezbollah.
Michael Chertoff and Richard Armitage were correct when they argued that Hezbollah has long been a multifaceted organization aware of its dependence on its Shia constituency. It has provided many aspects of governance to its constituency, including protection, health and human services, and some forms of justice. Since 2008, it has taken important steps to advance and solidify its legitimacy within Lebanon"s body politic. As Hezbollah continues down the path to legal legitimacy, there may be ways to encourage it to temper its radical behavior. Without question, a sovereign Hezbollah-led government will not guarantee a rational government friendly to the United States.
Hezbollah, like Iran, will likely continue to complicate efforts to bring peace to the region.
Political legitimacy, however, does confer a degree of responsibility and accountability in interstate dialogue, which may compel Hezbollah to improve its behavior. would be one that seeks to temper Hezbollah"s behavior by helping to shut off all avenues other than increased legitimacy. Restraining Israel from playing into Hezbollah"s narrative, undercutting Hezbollah"s ability to provide services to its supporters outside legitimate channels, and rewarding Hezbollah for working through legitimate means may all help ensure that Hezbollah"s capability comes under the control of a sovereign state, and that its intent is subject to the will of the people of Lebanon. Such a transition from violent non-state actor to legitimate political power would ultimately prove the most eloquent tribute to the validity and utility of the sovereign state.
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24 There are reports of Hezbollah activities in West Africa and South America but there is not much evidence that Hezbollah is doing more than what the U.S. would classify as terror financing as opposed to terror operations. Hezbollah sends money back from these regions and elsewhere but there is no convincing evidence that they are plotting actual attacks in any of these regions. 25 Kata'ib Hezbollah (KH) or Hezbollah Brigades is a Shia Iraqi Insurgent group that has been active since 2007 in the Iraq War. Not to be confused with Lebanese Hezbollah, the U.S. military believes it is an offshoot of the Special Groups, which are the Iranian-backed elements of the Mahdi Army. Kata"ib Hezbollah is a separate and independent organization and not part of the Mahdi Army and its Special Groups. According to the U.S. military, KH receives funding, training, logistics, and material from Iran's Quds Force. The U.S. state department claims Lebanese Hezbollah has provided weapons and training for the group. Known for uploading videos of its attacks against American forces on the internet, KH is responsible for numerous IED, mortar, rocket, RPG, and sniper attacks targeting U.S. and Iraqi Forces and the Green Zone, including a November 2008 rocket attack that killed two U.N. workers. 26 It is possible to overstate the transferability of the Hezbollah "blueprint" as the poor showing of Hamas in Gaza has shown. Other groups may lack the resources of Hezbollah (personnel, equipment, operational-and strategic-depth, command and control, intelligence, sustainment, etc.) and the training and discipline to make it all work effectively.
